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LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
versus
DIRECT ACTION STATUTES
H. Barton Williams*
I.

LIMITATION OF LIABILITY

The legislative history of the maritime limitation of liability
statutes, both in the United States and in England, is uncomplicated. The original sources are available, and in several important
opinions, the Supreme Court of the United States has set forth the
history of the limitation statutes.' Limitation of liability to the
value of the owner's interest in the vessel and freight is a principle
that springs solely from the general maritime law, and was not
recognized either at common law or by the civil law.
A.

EuropeanHistory

It is difficult, if not impossible, to say when and where the idea
of limitation of liability originated.' At common law, as administered both in England and America, the personal liability of the
owner of a vessel for damages by collision was the same as in other
cases of negligence, and was limited only by the amount of the loss
and by the owner's ability to respond.3 The civil law as well made
* Member, Louisiana, New York, and Tennessee Bars; Member, Committee
on Maritime Legislation, Maritime Law Association of the United States. B.S.,

1941, U.S. Naval Academy; LL.B., 1952, Vanderbilt University; J.D., 1961, Tulane University.
1. The author has relied greatly on these cases, particularly the expositions
by Mr. Justice Brown in The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122 (1894), and Mr.
Justice Bradley in Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104 (1871). See also
Richardsonv. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96 (1911), in which Mr. Justice Lurton made his
contribution to this branch of admiralty, and The Rebecca, 20 F. Cas. 373 (No.
11,619) (D. Me. 1831).
2. The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122 (1894); EMERIGON, TRArrt DES ASSURANCES ET DES CONTRATS A LA GROSSE, ch. 4, par. 11 (1783). However, the Consolato
del Mare, in two separate chapters, expressly limited the liability of the partowner to the value of his share in the ship. Vinnius, an early continental writer,
also stated that by the law of the land the owners were not chargeable beyond
the value of the ship and things that were in it. In addition, the Hanseatic
Ordianance of 1644 pronounced the goods of the owner discharged from claims
for damages by the sale of the ship to pay them.
3. The Wild Ranger, 167 Eng. Rep. 249, 256 (Adm. 1862); Cope v. Doherty,
70 Eng. Rep. 154, 158 (V.C. 1858); The Mellona, 166 Eng. Rep. 869, 879 (Adm.
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no distinction in favor of ship owners, nor did the ancient laws of
the merchant leagues of Oleron or Wisby or the Hanse towns suggest any restriction upon such liability.
By the end of the seventeenth century, limitation of liability had
become firmly established among the leading maritime nations of
Europe. The French Ordinance of 1681 served as a model for most
of the modem maritime codes, and declared that the owners of the
ship would be answerable for the acts of the master, but they would
be discharged therefrom on relinquishing the ship and freight.4 A
similar provision in the Ordinance of Rotterdam of 1721 declared
that the owners should not be answerable for any act of the master
done without their order, beyond their interest in the ship; and by
other articles of the same ordinance it was provided that each partowner should be liable for the value of his own share.'
The earliest legislation in England upon the subject was passed
in 1734, and provided that no shipowner should be responsible for
loss or damage to goods on board the ship by embezzlement of the
master or mariners, or for any damage occasioned by them without
the privity or knowledge of such owner, further than the value of
the ship and her appurtenances and the freight due or to grow due
for the voyage. If greater damage did not occur it was to be averaged among those who sustained it.' By subsequent acts this limitation of liability was extended to losses in which the master and
mariners had no part, to losses by their negligence, and to damage
done by collision. Furthermore, there was an entire exemption of
liability for loss or damage by fire or for loss of gold and jewelry,
unless its nature and value were disclosed. In all these statutes the
liability of the owner was limited to his interest in the ship and
freight for the voyage. 7
1848); The Aline, 166 Eng. Rep. 514 (Adm. 1839); The Dundee, 166 Eng. Rep.
39, 43 (Adm. 1823); Wilson v. Dickson, 106 Eng. Rep. 268 (K.B. 1818).
4. In addition to the cases set forth in note 3 supra see 2 PARSONS ON SHIPPING
& ADMiRALTY 120 (1869). The French Ordinance of 1681 was carried, with slight
change in phraseology, into the commercial code of France and all the other
maritime nations whose jurisprudence is founded upon the civil law. Code de
Commerce (French), art. 216; German Mar. Code, art. 452; Code of the Netherlands, art. 321; Belgian Code, art. 216; Italian Code, art. 311; Russian Code, art.
649; Spanish Code, arts. 621, 622; Portuguese Code, art. 1345; Brazilian Code, art.
494; Argentine Code, art. 1039; Chilean Code, art. 879; The Main v. Williams,
152 U.S. 122, 127 (1894).
5. 152 U.S. 122, 127 (1894).
6. 7 Geo. 2, c. 15 (1734).
7. 26 Geo. 3, c. 86 (1786); 53 Geo. 3, c. 159 (1813); 17 & 18 Vict., c. 104, § 503
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In order to establish a more uniform and equitable method of
limiting the liability of the owner, and to minimize some difficulties encountered in determining at what point of time the value of
the ship should be taken, the provisions of the prior acts were
extended to foreign as well as British ships, and to cases of loss of
life or personal injury, and to damage or loss to the cargo. These
revisions also provided that the owners should not be liable in
damages in respect of loss of life or personal injury in any one set
amount.8 In 1786, limitation of liability was extended to robbery
and to losses in which the master and mariners had no part.' By
1813, the liability limitation of shipowners had been further extended to cases of loss by negligence of the master or mariners and
to damage done to other ships and their cargoes, including cases
of collision. 10
The first of these two English statutes provided that if the loss
or damage fell on more than one party, either the parties injured
or the shipowners could file a bill in equity in chancery to ascertain
both the whole amount of the loss to the ship and its freight and
the value of the offending vessel and her freight so as to have a
proper distribution of the latter, pro rata,amongst those who sustained the damage. However, the second statute gave this remedy
to the shipowners alone-it being for their benefit and intended to
prevent a multiplicity of suits against them-although they were
obliged to pay the value of the vessel and freight into court, or to
give security for the amount and to acknowledge their liability,
inasmuch as the Court of Chancery having no admiralty jurisdiction could not investigate the question of liability. That being
done, owners were entitled to a stay of all suits brought against
them for damages. The statutes, however, contained no provision
for a surrender and assignment of the ship and freight, but only
for paying their value into a Chancery court.
Under these statutes, the English courts, since 1813, have held
that the value of the ship and freight was to be estimated as it
stood immediately prior to the injury, so that were the ship lost by
et seq. (1854); 25 & 26 Vict., c. 63, § 54 et seq. (1861). In 1854, freight was deemed
to include the value of the carriage of goods and passage money. Merchants
Shipping Act of 1854, 16 & 17 Vict., cs. 131, 104.
8. The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 127 (1894); The Merchants' Shipping
Act Amendment of 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., c. 63, § 54. See note 61 infra and accompanying text.
9. 26 Geo. 3, c. 86 (1786).
10. 53 Geo. 3, c. 159 (1813).
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the occurrence which caused the injury, or at any subsequent period before the completion of the voyage, the shipowners were still
liable for that value. These decisions, it will be seen, create an
important distinction between the English statutory law and the
maritime law, viz., the time at which the value is to be ascertained."
B. American History
The earliest American legislation upon this subject is a Massachusetts statute, taken substantially from the statute of George II,
passed in 1818 and revised in 1836. It was followed by an act of the
Maine legislature in 1821, copied from the statute of Massachusetts. 2 There was no congressional response to the necessity on a
national scale for similar legislation, however, until 1848, when the
Unites States Supreme Court decided The Lexington. 13 In that
case the owners of a steamboat, which was burnt on Long Island
Sound, were held liable for about 18,000 dollars in coin, which,
unknown to the shipowner, had been shipped upon the steamer
and lost. As a result of the uneasiness produced among shipowners
by this decision, and for the purpose of putting American shipping
on an equal footing with that of other maritime nations, Congress,
in 1851, enacted what is commonly known as the Limited Liability

Act."
11. French admiralty law followed a similar course. In1841, the law of France,
which had followed the general maritime law, was amended so as to operate still
further to the advantage of the shipowner by enabling him to obtain, by abandonment of ship and freight, a complete discharge not only from responsbility for the
acts and defaults of the captain but also for his engagements and contracts relative to the ship and the voyage. Code de Commerce, art. 216.
12. The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 128 (1894); Acts of 1818, ch. 122;
MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 32, §§ 1-4; MAiN REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 8-10.
13. New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank (The Lexington),
47 U.S. (6 How.) 343 (1848).
14. The Limited Liability Act of 1851, ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635. The authority of
Congress to enact the limitation of liability law was derived from the power to
regulate commerce and from a clause in the Constitution extending the judicial
power to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8;
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 404 (1907). In1880 and
again in 1883, the law was held constitutional under the commerce clause. Lord
v. Steamship Co., 102 U.S. 541, 545 (1880); Providence & N.Y.S.S. Co. v. Hill
Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578, 589 (1883). The Supreme Court later upheld the law
independently of the commerce clause under the judiciary clause, which gave the
law greater scope and made it co-extensive with general admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction. In re Garnett, 141 U.S. 12 (1891); Bulter v. Boston & Savannah S.S.
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The predominant characteristics of the early legislation in both
England and America, down to the passage of the Act by Congress
in 1851, may be summarized as follows:
(a) There was no right to surrender the ship; for a shipowner to
limit his liability it was necessary that he pay the value of the ship
into court in cash;
(b) In order to obtain the benefit of the statute, the shipowner
was forced to acknowledge his liability; there was no "petition for
exoneration from or limitation of" liability;
(c) The court held the shipowner to the value of his interest in
the vessel prior to the disaster;
(d) No procedure was laid down except a bill in equity to enforce
the limitation.
Both the American and the English limitation statutes were
preceded by preambles declaring that they were passed for the
purpose of encouraging shipping.'" The first section of the 1851
statute exempted ship-owners from loss by fire unless caused by
their own neglect; the second section exempted the shipowner from
liability for loss or damage to jewelry, precious metals, or money,
unless the character and value were disclosed in writing. The third
section was the heart of the Act of 1851, is the heart of the present
statutes, and remains the law, substantially unchanged, to the
present day. This section relieved the owner from any loss of any
property on board, caused by any person on board, by collision, "or
for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, forfeiture, done, occassioned, or incurred without the privity or knowledge of such owner
or owners" to the value of the interest of the owner in the vessel
and her freight. 6 The fourth section provided for a division of a loss
pro rataby several freighters. The fifth section granted a charterer
the right to limit liability. The sixth section provided that the act
was not to affect any remedy against the master and mariners. The
Co., 130 U.S. 527, 556-57 (1889). Such jurisdiction extends whereever public

navigation extends-on the sea, on the great inland lakes, and on the navigable
waters connecting them (130 U.S. at 557), including navigable rivers above tide
water (141 U.S. at 15).
15. The English Shipping Act of 1734 recited that "it was of the greatest
consequence to the Kingdom to promote the increase of the number of ships and
to prevent any discouragement to merchants and others from being interested and
concerned therein." 7 Geo. 2, c. 15 (1934).
16. The Limited Liability Act of 1851, ch. 43, § 3, 9 Stat. 635. The statute
remains substantially unchanged. 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1970). In The Scotland, 105
U.S. 24 (1881), the Court decided that the owner's interest should be valued after
the casualty.
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seventh section exempted inland vessels from the Act.
There were minor amendments in 1871, 1875, and 1877, and a
new section was added, by the Act of June 26, 1884, which extended the operation of the statutes by doing away with restrictions on the character of debts and liabilities against which limitation might be asserted. Under this provision, it was made possible
to limit liability against all claims except seamen's wages, i.e., the
benefits of the act were extended to non-maritime torts and to
claims arising either ex contractu or ex delicto.17 Finally, in 1886,
by the Act of June 19, 1886, the restrictions, excluding the application of the act to inland vessels, were removed and the limitation
statutes were amended to apply expressly "to all sea-going vessels,
and also to all vessels used on lakes and rivers or in inland
navigation ..

"18

Many attempts have been made to limit the application of the
limitation statutes by contention that subsequent statutes have,
by implication or otherwise, impliedly repealed the limitation statutes pro tanto. For example, the Supreme Court rejected an argument that claims under section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act of
1920 were not subject to limitation.19 In Butler v. Boston and Savannah Steamship Company,"0 it was contended that the Act of
February 28, 1871,1 relating to better security of life on board
vessels propelled by steam, superseded or displaced the proceeding
for limited liability in cases arising under its provisions, but the
Supreme Court rejected this contention by saying:
We do not see the necessity of drawing any such conclusion. The
act itself contains no provision of the kind. It requires certain precautions to be taken by owners of coasting steam-vessels and those
engaged in navigating them to avoid as far as possible danger to the
lives of passengers. Amongst other things, by the 51st section of the
act, (Rev. Stat. sec. 4401), it is provided that all coast-wise seagoing
steam-vessels, 'shall, when under way, except on the high seas, be
under the control and direction of pilots licensed by the inspectors
of steamboats.'
17. The Shipping Act of 1884, ch. 121, 23 Stat. 53.
18. Act of June 19, 1886, ch. 421, § 4, 24 Stat. 80.
19. In re East River Towing Co., 266 U.S. 355 (1924). A successful contention
of this kind was made in The Vestris, 1931 A.M.C. 1553 (S.D.N.Y. 1931), in which

Judge Goddard held that claims under the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 761, 768, are not subject to limitations if such right of action is granted by the
law of a foreign country.
20. 130 U.S. 527 (1889).

21.

Ch. 100, 16 Stat. 440.
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By the 43d section (Rev. Stat. sec. 4493) it is declared that whenever damage is sustained by a passenger or his baggage, the master
and owner, or either of them, and the vessel, shall be liable to the
full amount of damage if it happens through any neglect or failure
to comply with the provisions of the act, or through known defects,
etc. This is only declaring in the particular case, what is true in all,
that if the injury or loss occurs through the fault of the owner, he
will be personally liable, and cannot have the benefit of limited
liability. But it does not alter the course of proceeding if the claim
of limited liability is set up by the owner. If, in those proceedings,
it should appear that the disaster did happen with his privity or
knowledge, or, perhaps, if it should appear that the requirements of
the steamboat inspection law were not complied with by him, he
would not obtain a decree for limited liability; that is all.?
In Hines v. Butlern the court said:
Interpreting the provisions of the act of 1851 with those of the act
of 1871, or sections 4282, 4283 and 4493, together, the construction
would appear to be that as they are statutes upon the same subject,
that the earlier one creates a general rule of limitation of liability
as then existing and the later statute proceeds to2 make exceptions
for the better security and in favor of passengers. 1
The Supreme Court, in Norwich Co. v. Wright, 5 viewed the administration of relief under the act of 1851, as "no court is better
adapted than a court of admiralty to administer precisely such
relief. ' ' 2 In that case the Court outlined the procedure for limitation proceedings and on May 6, 1872, promulgated Admiralty
Rules 54-57 prescribing the practice in such proceedings.2 These
rules, with slight amendments, were carried over into Admiralty
Rules 51-54, promulgated December 6, 1920.2
These rules provide that a shipowner may claim benefit of the
22. 130 U.S. at 533.
23. 278 F. 877 (4th Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 659 (1922).
24. 278 F. at 881.
25. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104 (1871).
26. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 123.
27. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) xii-xiv (1871). In Providence & N.Y.S.S. Co. v. Hill
Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578 (1883), the Court upheld its power to make these rules on
the ground that the subject was "one preeminently of admiralty jurisdiction." 109
U.S. at 593.
28. 254 U.S. 24, 25-28 (1920). For a full discussion of procedure in limitation
proceedings see 3 A. KNAUTH & C. KNAUTH, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY chapter VI
(7th ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY]. The Admiralty
rules have now been consolidated with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
FED. R. Crv. P. Supp. R.F.
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limitation statutes by filing in a United States district court in
admiralty a petition for exemption from or limitation of liability,
in which proceeding he must either transfer his interest in the ship
and freight to a trustee for the benefit of claimants or he must pay
into court the appraised value thereof or file a stipulation (or bond)
in the amount of such value.2 1 In such proceeding all persons having claims against the shipowner or the ship are brought into concourse by monition and enjoined from suing the owner or the ship
on such claims in any other court 0 The petition for limitation
must be filed in the district wherein the ship has been sued in rem,
or, if the ship has not been sued in rem, in the district wherein the
ship or her remnants or proceeds may be, or wherein the shipowner
had been sued.'
In Hartford Accident Co. v. Southern Pacific Co.,3 the Court,
referring to a limitation proceeding, said: "It is the administration
of equity in an admiralty court. . . . The proceeding partakes in
a way of the features of a bill to enjoin a multiplicity of suits, a
bill in the nature of an interpleader, and a creditor's bill. 3 3 In that
case the district court denied the petitioner's prayer for limitation
of liability, but kept the limitation proceeding alive for the purpose
of furnishing claimants therein a complete remedy, which procedure was upheld by the Supreme Court. 34 In Spencer Kellogg &
Sons v. Hicks,35 wherein limitation was also denied, the Supreme
Court said that "the admiralty court, having taken jurisdiction
and brought all claimants into concourse, should have given complete relief."3 6
Thus, admiralty has exclusive jurisdiction if the shipowner's
right to limit liability is questioned. 3 The owner may set up such
right in his answer when sued, and prior to 1936 could even contest
29. The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468, 493, 502 (1886); Thommessan v.
Whitwill, 118 U.S. 520, 525-26 (1886); The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24, 34 (1881).
30. Hartford Accident Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 273 U.S. 207, 214-15 (1927).
31. In re Morrison, 147 U.S. 14, 33 (1893); City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468, 470
(1886); Ex parte Slayton, 105 U.S. 451, 452-53 (1881); Gleason v. Duffy, 116 F.
298, 301 (7th Cir. 1902). See FED. R. Crv. P. Supp. R.F.
32. 273 U.S. 207 (1927).

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
Corp.,

273 U.S. at 216.
273 U.S. at 217-18, 220.
285 U.S. 502 (1932).
285 U.S. at 512.
Ex parte Green, 286 U.S. 437, 439-40 (1932); In re Great Lakes Transit
63 F.2d 849, 851 (6th Cir. 1933).
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liability and, if defeated, then assert in admiralty his right to limit
liability.3 8
C.

Some Foreign Systems and International Conventions
of Limitation

In The Main v. Williams, Mr. Justice Brown, as discussed earlier, outlined the development of the legal principle limiting a
shipowner's liability to his interest in the vessel. M. Ripert, a
leading scholar in this field, points out that the laws of all countries
recognize the principle that the shipowner's liability is limited to
his "fortune de mer" and that this unanimity is evidence that the
rule is a fundamental one in maritime law." Although there is
complete agreement as to the general principle, there is, however,
wide diversity in its practical application."
1. French System.-The French system has been adopted in
Holland, Italy, Rumania, Spain, Portugal, Egypt, and Mexico and
in most of Central and South America." Ripert points out that the
law in the United States is not quite similar to the French law since
in the United States the value of the vessel and freight is fixed as
of the termination of the voyage. Under French law, on the other
hand, the freight abandoned is the freight with respect to the voyage preceding the abandonment, although this may be several
voyages after that on which liability accrued.42 As regards the ship,
she must be handed over "en nature" to the creditors.
Japanese law, also, appears to be derived from French sources.
Article 544 of the Japanese Commercial Code provides:
A shipowner may relieve himself of his liability for any act done
by the master within the scope of his legal authority, or for any
damage done to another person by the master or by any other mariner in the performance of his duties, by abandoning to the claimant
at the end of the voyage the ship, the freight, the passage money,
and any claim which he may have for damages or for remuneration
in connection with the ship: Provided that there has been no negligence on the part of the shipowner.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply to the
38. Larsen v. Northland Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 20 (1934); Steamship Co. v.
Mount, 103 U.S. 239, 243 (1880). But the right to limit liability could not first be
claimed on request for a charge to the jury.
39. M. RIPERT, DRorr MARrME 878 (1913).

40. Id. at 878.
41.

Id. at 890.

42. Id. at 945.
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rights of any mariner which may have arisen out of the contract of
service.
2. English System.-Under English laws43 the owners of a ship
"British or foreign" are entitled to limit their liability for losses
occurring "without their actual fault or privity" for (1) loss of life,
personal injury, or damage to goods, etc., on board the ship and,
also, for (2) loss of life, personal injury, or damage to goods, etc.,
on another vessel and damage to another vessel "by reason of the
improper navigation of the ship." The amount to be surrendered
is "in respect of loss of life or personal injury. .. an aggregate
amount not exceeding fifteen pounds" per ton; in respect of damage to vessels, goods, etc., an aggregate amount not to exceed eight
pounds per ton.44 The tonnage referred to in the statute is, of
course, registered tonnage and not dead-weight or displacement.
If a foreign ship has not been, and cannot be, measured, under
British law, particulars as to the ship's dimensions may be furnished to the surveyor general, who shall issue a certificate as to
the tonnage.
3. German System.-With reference to the German law, it is
interesting to quote from The German Law of Carriageof Goods
by Sea, by Dr. Alfred Sieveking:
In order to understand the system of the German law with regard
to the limitation of shipowner's liability, it is well to make this broad
and general statement, viz. that the laws of all commercial countries
concur in alleviating somehow or other the heavy burden of responsibility lying on shipowners' shoulders. This exception to the general
rule of respondent superior is not based on any principle, but on
equity, or rather, forms part of the commercial policy of a maritime
country. Shipowners' business and, consequently, friendly intercourse between maritime nations, would soon come to an end if the
law should either bind by too many restrictions individual freedom
with regard to contractual stipulations, or should make the
shipowner liable indiscriminately and without restriction for any
slight fault of his servants toward third parties with whom he is not
in contractual nexus. Considering the immense value of modern
43. E.g., Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, § 503, reproduced in TEMPERLEY'S
ACTS 311 (3d ed. 1961); 1 CARVER ON CARRIAGE BY SEA § 26
(12th ed. 1971).
44. While an examination of the antiquity of the rule might be of interest, it
is beyond the scope of the present inquiry. For discussion see The Scotland, 105
U.S. 24, 28 (1881); The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53, 68 (1868); M. MUELLER, LAST
ESSAYS, FIRST SERIES, 214. A careful survey of the whole subject is contained in 5
M. RIPERT, Dnorr MARITIME 876-976 (1913).
MERCHANT SHIPPING

DIRECT ACTION STATUTES
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ships and modem cargoes, to destroy which a slight error or petty
negligence committed by master or crew of either the carrying or the
colliding vessel would suffice, shipowners would face ruin if the law
did not come to their aid. Therefore, not in order to encourage, but
to enable shipowners to carry on their business, their liability must
be a limited one. This is a point of national interest and protection.
The manner in which this limitation is practically to be applied
is a matter of mere convenience and of legal method. Two considerations must be kept well apart from one another: the limit of liability
and the cases in which the limitation applies. With regard to the
limit of liability the system of the German Code springs from historical ground; the descendants found no reason for altering the work
of their forefathers. With regard to the application of the rule of
limited liability to certain defined cases, the Maritime Code started
from the idea, already mentioned, that in equity the shipowner
cannot be made liable for the faults of persons over whom he has
no control. The system of limited liability, as laid down in our
Maritime Code, is founded on convenience and legal method.
Centuries past, the system of limiting shipowner's liability to ship
and freight, relieving him from personal liability, became largely the
custom and the law regulating European commerce. But whereas in
France and adjoining countries the idea of the Roman noxae datio
led to the system of abandonment now in force, Germany adhered
to the views and ideas of German law in establishing from the outset
the rule that the thing itself, and not the owner, is liable for any
damage done by it, that is to say, that the owner is in no way
personally liable, but is bound to hand over the ship and her freight
to meet the claims of his creditors, or rather of the creditors of the
ship.45
4.

International Conventions

(a) Brussels Convention, 1924. -In October, 1922, a conference
was held at Brussels to formulate rules as to limitation of liability.
At this conference twenty-four governments were represented by
delegates." After discussion, the delegates unanimously agreed to
recommend to their respective governments a "Draft International
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating
'4 7
to the Limitations of Liability of Owners of Seagoing Vessels.

45. As quoted in 9 M. RIPERT, DROIT MARITImE 85-86 (1913).
46. Argentina, Belgium, Chile, Cuba, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Great Britain, Holland, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Serbia, Spain, the United States, and Uruguay.

47. Text in full at 6A BENEDICT

ON ADMIRALTY

625.
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The American delegates, 8 in their report to the President of the
United States dated December 20, 1922, summarized the proposed
convention as follows:
The results of this proposed treaty, from the viewpoints of
shipowner, cargo owners, and other claimants, we may summarize
as follows:
The shipowner benefits because:
1. His liability is limited in any event to £8 per ton with respect
to claims other than those for personal injury and loss of life, and
an additional £8 per ton with respect to the latter class of claims.
2. A limitation proceeding in one country is given recognition in
all other countries parties to the convention.
All claimants benefit because,
1. Even if the vessel is a total loss, and although there was no
pending freight, a limitation fund is provided equal to 10 per cent
of the value of the vessel at the commencement of the voyage.
2. The limitation fund also receives any compensation for material damage sustained by the vessel since the beginning of the voyage and not repaired, and any general average contributions with
respect to the same.
3. In the event of more than one accident on the same voyage
the diminution of value so caused is not taken into account in considering claims connected with previous accidents.
4. The shipowner is not permitted to secure exoneration by the
surrender of his vessel, but is compelled to prove its value.
5. A separate fund for personal injury and loss of life claimants
of £8 per ton in every case.
The outstanding features of the changes proposed in existing
American law are:
1. The limitation of the shipowner's liability to £8 per ton, in
respect of claimants other than personal injury or loss of life claimants.
2. The creation of a fund of 10 per cent of the value of the ship
at the commencement of the voyage, even in cases of total loss.
3. The abolition of the right to surrender the ship.
4. The creation of a fund of £8 per ton to pay personal injury
and loss of life claims. This not only insures compensation to such
claimants, but benefits other claimants by decreasing the number
of claimants with whom they must share the limitation fund available to them.
48. The United States was represented by the Honorable Charles M. Hough
and Mr. Norman B. Beecher. Judge Hough is a distinguished and well known
member of the admiralty bar and district and circuit court judge, while Mr.
Beecher has had great experience in admiralty matters.
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5. The establishment of a uniform system of limitation of liability to be internationally recognized and respected.
We recognize the difficulties that may arise in the practical administration of this convention, particularly in cases where claims
are asserted in the courts of different nations; but we believe that
these difficulties are not insurmountable, and may properly be left
to be remedied as they arise, by subsequent conference. 49
The final text of the convention was signed by several obligations during August, 1924, but no United States delegate signed.
This convention was finally ratified by fourteen countries, 0 but not
by the United States.
(b) Brussels Convention, 1957.-At the Tenth Diplomatic
Conference on Private Maritime Law, held at Brussels from September 30 through October 10, 1957, an International Convention
Relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Seagoing Ships5' was
drawn up and signed by several delegations. No member of the
United States delegation, comprised of the Honorable Clarence G.
Morse (Maritime Administrator and Chairman of the Federal
Maritime Board), John W. Mann (State Department), Oscar
Houston, Esq., and E. Robert Seaver, Esq., signed the convention.52 Forty nations had either ratified or adhered to the 1957
Brussels Convention by 1967. 51

49.

6A

BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY

625.

50. The Netherlands (not specifically but through harmonization of Dutch
law), Belgium (1930), Brazil (1931), Denmark (1930), Finland (1934), France
(1935), France for Algeria (1936), Hungary (1930), Iceland (1930), Monaco (1931),
Norway (1933), Poland (1936), Portugal (1930), Spain (1930), Sweden (1938), and
Turkey (1955).
51.
52.

Text in full at 6A BENEDICT ON ADMRALTY 636-41.
6A BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 634-36. The text of the 1957 Convention is also

fully reported. Id., at 635-41.
53. Great Britain and Northern Ireland ratification February 18, 1959; France
ratification July 7, 1959; Spain ratification July 16, 1959; Isle of Man adherence
November 18, 1960; Ghana adherence July 26, 1961; Singapore adherence April
17, 1963; Sweden ratification June 4, 1964; Algeria adherence August 18, 1964;
Finland ratification August 19, 1964; Bahamas adherence August 21, 1964; Bermuda adherence August 21, 1964; British Antarctica adherence August 21, 1964;
British Honduras adherence August 21, 1964; British Solomon and Falkland Islands adherence August 21, 1964; Fiji Islands adherence August 21, 1964; Gibralter adherence August 21, 1964; Gilbert and Ellice Islands adherence August 21,
1964; Hong Kong adherence August 21, 1964; Mauritius adherence August 21,
1964; Seychelles adherence August 21, 1964; British Virgin Islands adherence
August 21, 1964; Guernsey and Jersey Islands adherence October 21, 1964; Norway ratification March 1, 1965; Denmark ratification March 1, 1965; Malagasy
Republic adherence July 13, 1965; Cayman Islands adherence August 4, 1965;
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Limitation of Liability in the United States as it Exists Today

The core of the present limitation statute is found in Title 46
United States Code, Section 183, which provides "The liability of
the owner of any vessel . . .for any act, matter, or thing, loss,

damage or forfeiture done, occasioned or incurred, without the
privity or knowledge of such owner.

.

shall not.

. .

exceed the

amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel and
her freight then pending." The term "owner" includes owners of
shares in the vessel, foreign owners,54 and a bareboat charterer "in
case he shall man, victual and navigate the vessel at his own expense or by his own procurement.

liability. 6 In

5' 5 A

time charterer is not enti-

tled to limit
addition, the right to limitation of liability has been extended to the owners of "all vessels used on lakes
or rivers or in inland navigation, including canal boats, barges and
lighters" providing the casualty happened on navigable waters of
57
the United States.
The essential ingredient for claiming limitation of liability is
that the cause of the casualty not be within the "privity or knowledge" of the owner. "Privity or knowledge" is a term of art meanDominica adherence August 4, 1965; Grenada adherence August 4, 1964;
Montserrat adherence August 4, 1965; St. Lucia adherence August 4, 1965; St.
Vincent adherence August 4, 1965; Turks and Caicos Islands adherence August
4, 1965; United Arab Republic adherence September 7, 1965; the Netherlands
ratification December 10, 1965; Switzerland ratification January 21, 1966; Guiana
adherence March 25, 1966; Iran adherence April 26, 1966; New Hebrides (FrenchBritish condominium) adherence December 8, 1966; Congo (Democratic Republic) adherence July 16, 1967; and Israel ratification November 30, 1967.
The countries and the system employed in each are listed as follows: Argentina,
French; Australia, English; Belgium, Brussels Convention; Brazil, Brussels Convention; Canada, English; Chile, French; Colombia, French; Cuba, French; Denmark, Brussels Convention; Egypt, French; Finland, Brussels Convention;
France, French; Germany, German; Great Britain, English; Greece, French;
India, British; Italy, French; Japan, French; Mexico, French; Netherlands, Brussels Convention; New Zealand, English; Nicaragua, French; Norway, Brussels
Convention; Paraguay, French; Portugal, Brussels Convention; Rumania,
French; South Africa, English; Spain, Brussels Convention; Sweden, Brussels
Convention; Uruguay, French; Venezuela, French. Id. at 635-36.
54. See, e.g., The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24 (1882); Pennell v. Read, 309 F.2d 455
(5th Cir. 1962).
55, See, e.g., Admiral Towing Co. v. Wodlen, 290 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1961)
(possession and control alone not sufficient); Dupont v. Bentley, 19 F.2d 354 (2d
Cir. 1927).
56. In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 409 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1969).
57. In re Madsen, 187 F. Supp. 411 (N.D.N.Y. 1960); In re Keller, 149 F. Supp.
513 (D.C. Minn. 1956).
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ing "complicity in the fault that caused the accident."58 Many
courts have defined "privity or knowledge," but one of the clearest
definitions was by Judge Ainsworth, who said "Privity means personal cognizance or participation in the fault or negligence which
causes the accident [citing cases] . . . .The term knowledge as
used in the statute has been held to mean not only personal cognizance but also the means of knowledge of which a party must avail
himself in order to prevent a condition likely to produce or contribute to a loss [citing cases] . . . ,,"1
Hence an individual owner
must personally participate in the fault or negligence which causes
the injury. In particular, if the individual owner delegates authority to a competent man, he may not be charged with constructive
privity or knowledge."
1. The LimitationFund.-Ifno deaths or injuries are involved,
the limitation fund consists of the value of the vessel at the end of
the voyage plus the earning or "pending freight" of that voyage."
It may be curious to speak of freights already earned as still "pend-

ing," but that was the effect of the decision in The Main v.
Williams.2 There, the fares of passengers had been prepaid in
advance, but were nevertheless treated as pending freight for, as
Mr. Justice Brown observed, the phrase is used as an equivalent
of the "earnings of the voyage."63
58. Blackler v. Jacobus, 243 F.2d 733, 735 (2d Cir. 1957).
59. Greater New Orleans Expressway v. The Clairbel, 222 F. Supp. 521, 524
(E.D. La 1963), aff'd sub nom. Coleman v. Jahncke, 341 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1965).
See also 3 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY §§ 41 (individual owners), and 42 (corporate
owners) (7th ed. 1969), for additional cases and definitions. Recent cases defining
corporate privity and knowledge are essentially in accordance with Judge Ainsworth. See Smith Voyager, 439 F.2d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1971); China Union Lines,
Ltd. v. A.O. Anderson & Co., 364 F.2d 769, 787 (5th Cir. 1966); Slaten v. Hopemount Shipping Co., 345 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1965); Avera v. Florida Towing Corp.,
322 F.2d 155, 166 (5th Cir. 1963); Donegan Hills, 282 F.2d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 1960).
60. Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406 (1943).
61. 46 U.S.C. § 183(b) (1970) provides:
In the case of any seagoing vessel, if the amount of the owner's liability as
limited under subsection (a) of this section is insufficient to pay all losses
in full, and the portion of such amount applicable to the payment of losses
in respect of loss of life or bodily injury is less than $60 per ton of such
vessel's tonnage, such portion shall be increased to an amount equal to $60
per ton, to be available only for the payment of losses in respect of loss of
life or bodily injury. If such portion so increased is insufficient to pay such
losses in full, they shall be paid therefrom in proportion to their respective
amounts.
62. 152 U.S. 122 (1894).
63. Cf. The San Simeon, 63 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1933).
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Should the vessel whose owner seeks limitation make a recovery
for collision damages, this recovery becomes part of her limitation
fund, although the owner's insurance proceeds are not considered
part of the fund." It is this latter situation that, at least partially,
has instigated the passing of direct action statutes, which will be
considered subsequently in this article.
In the case of a tug and tow owned by the same party, the law
is not so clear as to whether the tow must also be included in the
limitation fund. On the one hand, it has been affirmatively held
that should a tug bring an innocent tow into collision with another
vessel, the tow being only "the passive instrument of harm," the
tow should not be included in the limitation fund. 5 On the other
hand, in the event that there is a contractual relationship and
more than one vessel is being used to carry out the contract, then
both the tug and tow are required to be surrendered.66
2. The Limitation Complaint.-If an owner wishes to bring
into concourse all the claims from a given casualty, he must, pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 185, file a complaint seeking exoneration and
limitation of liability within six months from receipt of the first
written notice of claim. A careful attorney will generally take the
date of the casualty so as to be sure that he is within the six month
period. The procedure for filing the complaint is outlined in Supplemental Rule F of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The sixmonth deadline does not apply if limitation is claimed in an answer. However, it will only be limitation as to that suit, and would
have the same effect as if there were only one claim.67
3. The Burden of Proof.--In seeking exoneration from or limitation of liability, [plaintiffs] are required to establish that the
vessel was seaworthy when she broke ground.

. .

and to bring out

the facts known to them which might have a bearing on the cause
of disaster."" The same thought was expressed by Judge Learned
Hand in the S.S. Hewitt:
64. O'Brien v. Miller, 148 U.S. 287, 305 (1892); The City of Norwich, 118 U.S.
468 (1886).

65. Liverpool, Brazil & River Plate Steam Navigation Co. v. Brooklyn E. Dist.
Terminal, 251 U.S. 48 (1919); but see Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn 352 U.S. 914
(1956) aft'g Petition of Lake Tankers Corp., 232 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1956).

66. Sacramento v. Salz, 273 U.S. 326, 322 (1926); Standard Dredging Co. v.
Kristiansen, 67 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1933). See also In re Drill Barge No. 2, 454 F.2d
408 (5th Cir. 1972) (the court apparently relied on the fact that "all three vessels
contributed to the collision").
67. See, e.g., Deep Sea Tankers v. The Long Brush, 258 F.2d 757, 772 (2d Cir.
1958); The Checkie, 141 F.2d 80, 84-85 (3d Cir. 1944).
68. The Smith Voyager, 203 F. Supp. 172, aff'd, 409 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1971).
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In undertaking to prove that the loss did not occur without his
privity, the owner must necessarily show either just how the loss did
occur, or, if he cannot, he must exhaust all of the possibilities and
show that as to each he was without privity. 9
Accordingly, it is necessary for the plaintiff, in a limitation proceeding, to produce all the evidence that is possible, and show that
he was without privity or knowledge of the casualty.
II.

DIRECT ACTION STATUTES AND AVOIDANCE OF THE LIMITATION
STATUTES

The limitation statutes discussed in the foregoing section are all
premised on the principle that an owner of a ship may limit his
liability by surrendering a sum of money or the ship, or both,
providing the casualty occurred without his fault, knowledge, or
privity. The statutes do not refer to insurers or underwriters, and
until about 1950 it was thought that the liability of insurers was
limited as is the owner's. The principal vehicle used to accomplish
this result was to word the insurance contract as an indemnity
contract so the insurance company did not have to pay until the
assured paid, and its liability was thus measured and limited by
the amount paid by the assured.
However, in 1950, Louisiana codified its insurance law and included a provision that: "The injured person or his heirs, at their
option, shall have a right of direct action against the insurers
within the terms and limits of the policy. . . and said action may
be brought against the insurer alone or against both the insured
and insurer jointly ... "10
This was the development from legislation, not unlike that in
most states, that prohibited issuance of insurance policies that
barred recovery from insurers if the insured tortfeasor became
bankrupt. In 1930 the scope of this legislation was broadened to
allow direct action against either the tortfeasor, or insurer, or both,
jointly and in solido, if the accident or injury occurred in Louis71
iana.
Thereafter, the initial consensus of authorities was, not illogically, that this statute did not apply to marine policies of insur69. S.S. Hewitt, 284 F. 911, 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1922). The same language is used
and the same idea expressed in Terracciano v. McAlinded, 485 F.2d 304 (2d Cir.
1973). Also see Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp., 314
U.S. 104 (1941), for a discussion of the burden of going forward with the evidence.
70. 22 LA. REv. STAT. § 655 (1959).
71. No. 55, [19301 La. Acts.
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ance.72 The Louisiana Insurance Code defined "Liability Insurance" as well as "Ocean Marine and Foreign Trade Insurance" and
distinguished between the two.73 In addition, the code exempted
ocean and marine insurance from the application of direct action.74
One would have thought that this ended the matter, but the
Fifth Circuit, in Cushing v. Maryland Casualty Co.,75 said: "The
Louisiana legislature did not intend to deny the right of direct
action to persons covered by marine policies, while extending it to
others." On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court in
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing" divided 4-4-1, four justices
believing the direct action statute conflicted with the limitation of
liability statutes, four justices seeing no conflict, and a single justice taking the best of both worlds, and removing any conflict by
staying suits brought under the Direct Action Statute until after
trial of limitation of liability. To break the deadlock, the four
justices who found the direct action statute in conflict with the
limitation of liability statutes adopted this solution. 7 Thus, the
Supreme Court avoided the question whether the direct action
statute was in conflict with the limitation statutes.
In response to Cushing, the Louisiana Legislature amended the
Direct Action Statute in 1962 to declare the legislative intent of the
statute to be "that all liability policies within their term and limits
are executed for the benefit of all injured persons.

insured is liable . .
72.

. .

to whom the

. .

See Cushing v. Texas & P.R.R., 99 F. Supp. 681, 683 (E.D. La. 1951)

(opinion by Wright, J.).
73. Section 6(4) of Insurance Code defined "liability insurance" as
"[ilnsurance against liability of insured for death or disability or employee or
other person, and against the liability of the insured for damage to or destruction
of another's property." In contrast, section 6(13) defined Ocean Marine Insurance
as "insurance against legal liability of the assured for loss, damage or expense
arising out of the ownership . . . of any vessel . . . including the liability of the
insured for personal injury or death, or for loss of or damage to property of another
person."
74. 22 LA. REv. STAT. § 611 (1959).
75. Cushing v. Maryland Cas. Co., 198 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1952).
76. 198 F.2d at 538.
77. 347 U.S. 409 (1954).
78. Justice Frankfurter and three of his associates would have reinstated the
district court dismissal. Justice Black and three others would have affirmed.
Justice Clark, in a concurring opinion, actually wrote the opinion of the court,
because the Frankfurter group acquiesced in his opinion as the judgment of the
Court.
79. 22 LA. REv. STAT. § 655(2) (1959), as amended by No. 471, [1962] La. Acts
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Thereafter, the question arose again in In Re Independent Towing Co. , in which Judge Ellis held that limitation of liability was
a defense personal to the shipowner and was not available to the
insurance company. It was not long until the same question was

faced in Olympic Towing Corporationv. Nebel Towing Company.'
Although the panel divided seven to six, the Fifth Circuit, en banc,
after upholding the right of a claimant to file a direct action
against the insurance companies, denied a petition for rehearing,
holding:
We hold that any conflict between the direct action statute and
the federal provision for a concursus of claims in admiralty is so
minimal as to be insignificant.
Regarding the matter of higher premiums, even if this question
had not been implicitly disposed of by Cushing, we would reject the
contention. To begin with, since in the vast majority of cases, limitation is denied for one reason or another, it may well be questioned

how significantly the possibility of limitation figures into the actuarial computation of premiums."2 (Emphasis supplied).
The six dissenting judges and particularly Chief Judge John R.
Brown, were not inclined to dismiss so casually the possibility of
limitation of liability:
Thus the Court errs in proceeding as though the Supreme Court
had resolved either the construction, application and interpretation
of Louisiana statute, or, equally important, the extent to which its
impact upon the underwriter can amount to a direct burden on the
shipowner in excess of that which Congress has determined he shall
bear when entitled to his liability under the Statute ....
The Statute was not intended to create a new liability against the
insurer. It was intended merely to afford a direct, non-circuitous
means of satisfaction of a claim judicially determined to be owing
by the assured and which is within the limits and terms of the
coverage afforded by the insurance policy. This is the plain language
83
of the Act itself ....
The dissenters continued:
As long as the Direct Action Statute subjects the insurer to no
greater liability than the assured would have, it fulfills the Louis80. 272 F. Supp. 950 (E.D. La. 1965). The case was settled without appeal and
therefore we are without the benefit of comment by an appellate court.
81. 419 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1969).
82. 419 F.2d at 235.
83. Id. at 240.
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iana policy of public protection and avoids troublesome questions
of conflict between state and federal maritime law. The court's reading rewrites the contract, imposes liability beyond that of the assured and ignores substantive limitations on liability under maritime principles. The essential uniformity of the admiralty is at an
end when for a like casualty across the line in Texas the 'liability'
of the shipowner is less-by the amount of total damages and the
policy limits-than it is in Louisiana. 4
That the limitation of liability statute is not yet dead is apparent from examining Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. MIV Catayannis S,5 involving a vessel patently unseaworthy with respect to her radio,
which prevented the master from raising the pilot station, resulting in the vessel being stranded. After carefully considering the
facts, the court held that the proximate cause of the accident was
the negligence of the master, and not the unseaworthiness of the
vessel. The court further stated that limitation of liability for negligent navigation is not conditioned on unseaworthiness, or even on
a showing that due diligence had been exercised."
It would seem, therefore, that the majority of the en banc Fifth
Circuit was too quick to bury the limitation statute. However,
undeniably, insofar as the Fifth Circuit is concerned, the law is as
stated in Olympic Towing.
Louisiana is not the only state to pass a direct action statute.
Such statutes have been enacted in Puerto Rico, Wisconsin, and
Rhode Island. Thus far the direct action statute has come into
conflict with the limitation statutes only in Puerto Rico. In Torres
v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Company,7 the court reviewed the
history of the direct action statute and accepted a statement by
the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico that the Puerto Rican statutes
were amended in 1958 to bring the direct action statute "completely in line with the Louisiana Direct Action Statute." 88
The Puerto Rico statute provides:
The insurer issuing a policy insuring any person against loss or
damage through legal liability for the bodily injury, death, or damage to property of a third person, shall become absolutely liable
whenever a loss covered by the policy occurs, and payment of such
loss by the insurer to the extent of his liability therefore under the
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 246.
305 F. Supp.
306 F. Supp.
275 F. Supp.
275 F. Supp.

866 (D.Ore. 1969).
at 871.
784 (D.P.R. 1967).
at 788.
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policy shall not depend upon payment by the insured of or any final
judgment against him arising out of such occurrence.89
Any individual sustaining damages and losses shall have, at his
option, a direct action against the insurer under the terms and limitations of the policy, which action he may exercise against the insurer and the insured jointly. The direct action against the insurer
may only be exercised in Puerto Rico. The liability of the insurer
shall not exceed that provided for in the policy and the Court shall
determine, not only the liability of the insurer, but also the amount
of the loss. Any action brought under this section may be subject to
the conditions of the policy or contract and to the defenses that may
be pleaded by the insurer to the direct action instituted by the
insured . .

..

If the plaintiff in such an action brings suit against the insured
alone, such shall not be deemed to deprive him of the right, by
subrogation, to the rights of the insured under the policy, to maintain action against the recovery from the insurer after securing final
judgment against the insured."
The trial judge in Torres v. InterstateFire & Casualty Company,
facing the question whether a direct action against the insurance
company could be enjoined, relied heavily on the views of Judge
Ellis in Independent Towing, in allowing the direct action to proceed to trial without waiting for a trial on entry of judgment in the
limitation of liability proceeding, as the amount of insurance available exceeded the claimed damages.92 It may be that if the insurance is insufficient to pay the claims then the limitation of liability
proceeding would be tried first.
Both Louisiana and Puerto Rico have a civil law background as
a basis of their contrast to the common law background of the
remainder of the United States, and this may, to some extent,
explain the views of the courts in those jurisdictions. In at least two
other jurisdictions, however, courts have created rights of direct
action against the insurer. The Florida Supreme Court created a
right of direct action in Shingleton v. Bussey, 3 and the New York
Court of Appeals created a similar right in Seider v. Roth.9 4 However, no case has been found in which the right of action created
in these decisions has been used to escape limitation of liability
procedures.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

26 LAWS PUERTO Rico ANN. § 2001 (1958).
26 LAWS PUERTO Rico ANN. § 2003(1) (1958).
26 LAWS PUERTO Rico ANN. § 2003(2) (1958).
See text accompanying note 81 supra.
223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
216 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1966).
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CONCLUSION

The limitation of liability statutes are in full force and effect,
and with the exception of the State of Louisiana and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the courts freely grant limitation. There is
no right to proceed against insurance companies directly in an
avoidance or evasion of the statutes except in jurisdictions with
direct action statutes.
In Louisiana and Puerto Rico, the state direct action statute has
been used to avoid the effect of federal limitation statutes. However, the matter is not yet settled, for this interpretation of the
direct action statute rests upon Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing,
in which the Supreme Court reached no decision, and on Olympic
Towing Corporation v. Nebel Towing Company, in which the en
banc Fifth Circuit divided on the proper application of the direct
action statute of Louisiana. Therefore, in the future, particularly
if Congress modernizes the limitation statutes, there may be still
an opportunity to invoke the limitation statutes in Louisiana and
Puerto Rico in spite of the direct action statutes. 5
The application of the direct action statutes, which purport to
give to plaintiffs a new procedure and not a new cause of action,
appears to be a strained interpretation. After all, most things are
insured these days, and this is true of maritime matters. Therefore,
to require the maritime insurers to pay more than their insured
may be required to pay is to avoid the purpose of the limitation
statutes, which is to encourage shipping by allowing shipowners to
fix their exposure to liability to the value of their interest in a
particular venture. It is pure sophistry to say the underwriters pay,
and not the shipowner, because the underwriters receive their
money from premiums charged to the shipowner, and if the underwriter pays, the shipowner will eventually pay through higher
premiums or the disappearance of the insurance market. Either
result would be adverse to the shipping industry and would effectively negate the purpose behind the limitation of liability statutes.
95.

With regard to Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and Arkansas, no decisions have

become available to determine the impact of the direct action statutes of those
states in admiralty proceedings.

